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I. INTRODUCTION
Reorganizations under Chapter 111 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code2
involve a process by which the owner and creditors of a debtor-enter-
prise negotiate a restructuring of the financially distressed business.3
* Assistant Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law. B.A. Augus-
tana College, 1980; J.D. University of Iowa College of Law, 1983. I am grateful for the
helpful comments of Patrick B. Bauer, Reta R. Noblett-Feld, and Carol B. Swanson on
earlier drafts of this article.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
2. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1330 (1979 & West Supp. 1992) (hereinafter "the Code").
3. See Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bank-
ruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 762-80 (1991) (bankruptcy reorganization provides a
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Sometimes the negotiating process fails and the owner attempts to
"cram down," or force, a reorganization plan on dissenting classes of
creditors.4 Currently, courts are divided over an issue that is critical
both to the parties' ability to negotiate a consensual plan and to the
owner's ability to cram down a plan on dissenting creditors: whether
the new value exception to the absolute priority rule survived enact-
ment of the 1978 Code.5
process for the interested parties to debate and to decide about the debtor's future
potential).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1988). See generally Charles D. Booth, The Cramdown on
Secured Creditors. An Impetus Toward Settlement, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69 (1986) (the
risks of valuation make it more advantageous to negotiate than cram down a plan);
Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New
Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979) (explaining "cramdown" as a means
of confirming a reorganization plan over the protests of a dissenting class); Linda J.
Rusch, Gerrymandering the Classfication Issue in Chapter Eleven Reorganizations, 63
U. CoLo. L. REV. 163, 167-75 (1992) (debtor cannot cram down a plan unless it is fair
and equitable to all dissenting impaired classes and does not unfairly discriminate
against dissenting classes of impaired claims).
5. See, e.g., In re Snyder, 967 F.2d 1126, 1128-31 (7th Cir. 1992) (deferring decision
on whether "new value" survives in this Code, dictum that it probably survived); In re
Bryson Properties XVII, 961 F.2d 496, 503-05 (4th Cir. 1992) (held even if new value
survives Code, criteria not met in this case), cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3061 (July 16,
1992); Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F. 2d 1351, 1359-
63 (7th Cir. 1990) (refusing to rule on the new value exception because it was not prop-
erly preserved in the court below); In re A.V.B.I., 1992 WL 201264 (Bankr. L.D. Cal.
July 29, 1992) (new value exception does not exist); In re Bonner Mall Partnership,
1992 WL 171900 (D. Idaho July 15, 1992) (new value exception still viable); In re Sover-
eign Group 1985-27, Ltd., 1992 WL 172641 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1992) (same); In re Ba-
Hen, 1992 WL 143812 (Bankr. W.D. L.a June 10, 1992) (same); In re Montgomery Court
Apartment of Ingham County Ltd., 141 B.R. 324, 342-44 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992)
(same); In re Ribs Auto Sales, Inc., 140 B.R. 390, 395-96 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992) (dicta
that no new value exception permitted); In re SLC Limited V, 137 B.R. 847, 850-55
(Bankr. D. Utah 1992) (new value exception exists); In re James, 1992 WL 21365
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (new value exception did not survive passage of the Code); In
re Bjolmes Realty Trust, 134 B.R. 1000, 1003-08 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) (concluding that
the "fresh contribution" is viable); In re Woodscape Ltd. Partnership, 134 B.R. 165,
168-76 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991) (refusing to decide the question whether the new value
exception survives passage of the Code); In re Triple R Holdings, L.P., 134 B.R. 382,
384-92 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991), rev'd 1992 WL 237328 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 1992) (hold-
ing that the new value exception survived passage of the Code); In re Professional
Dev. Corp., 133 B.R. 425 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1991) (new value exception remains via-
ble); In re Tallahassee Assocs., L.P., 132 B.R. 712, 715-17 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (hold-
ing that new value exception remains viable); Piedemont Assocs. v. CIGNA Property
& Casualty Ins., 132 B.R. 75, 79 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (the new value exception did not sur-
vive passage of the Code); In re Outlook/Century Ltd., 127 B.R. 650, 654-58 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 1991) (same); In re Lumber Exchange Ltd. Partnership, 125 B.R. 1000, 1006-
08 (Bankr. D. Minn.) (same) aff'd, 134 B.R. 454 (D. Minn. 1991), aff'd on other
grounds, 1992 WL 143303 (8th Cir. June 29, 1992); In re 222 Liberty Assocs., 108 B.R.
971, 983-85 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (new capital exception survived passage of the
Code); In re Drimmel, 108 B.R. 284, 288-90 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989), aff'd, 135 B.R. 410
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1991) (new value exception did not survive passage of the the Code);
In re Pullman Constr. Indus. Inc., 107 B.R. 909, 943-48 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (new cap-
ital exception retains its vitality); In re Winters, 99 B.R. 658, 660-63 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1989) (new capital exception did not survive passage of the Code). The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals originally decided that the new value exception did not survive the
1312
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The absolute priority rule requires full payment to each class of
senior claimants before any member of a junior class can receive a
monetary distribution under the plan on account of its junior claim
or interest.6 Thus, absolute priority requires full payment to secured
claim holders before any payment to unsecured claim holders, and
full payment to unsecured claim holders before any payment to hold-
ers of equity interests. The new value exception allows the debtor's
owner, the equity holder, to receive or to retain an equity interest in
the reorganized business through a contribution of new value, even if
all senior claimants are not paid in full.7 The essence of the debate
over the existence of the new value exception is whether the current
owner of a bankrupt business should be able to buy her way into
ownership of the reorganized business over the objections of un-
secured creditors who have not been paid in full through the reor-
ganization process.
The new value issue is especially important in the context of a non-
publicly held company if the owner of that company participates in
the management or daily business operations. Ownership and man-
agement of a publicly held business does not usually rest with the
same group of persons. When ownership and management are di-
vided, the same management team can continue working, despite a
change in ownership, without a significant impact on continuous busi-
ness operations. In contrast, the non-publicly held business is more
likely to have ownership and management residing in the same per-
son or group of persons. When management and ownership are not
divided, changing ownership usually requires new management un-
less the former owner agrees to continue running the business as an
employee of the new owners. The new value issue is most important
to a non-publicly held business because the new value exception sig-
nificantly impacts the distribution of management control and the
business' financial value.8 Therefore, this article focuses on the new
enactment of the 1978 Code. In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 948 F.2d 134, 142 (5th
Cir. 1991). That opinion was withdrawn and the new value portion of the opinion va-
cated on February 27, 1992. A petition for certiorari has been filed. 61 USLW 3060
(June 26, 1992).
6. See infru notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
8. See iifra note 63 and accompanying text. See Ralph A. Peeples, Staying in:
Chapter 11, Close Corporations and the Absolute Priority Rule, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65,
76 (1989) (arguing for a separate set of rules for reorganization in closely-held corpora-
tions). As one study demonstrates, in reorganizations of large publicly held companies,
the absolute priority rule and the new value exception do not heavily influence the
bargaining over the distribution of the going concern value. Lynn M. LoPucki & Wil-
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value issue as it applies to non-publicly held businesses where the
owner participates in the business' management.
The division among courts that have addressed the new value issue
reflects the extreme difficulty of discerning whether Congress in-
tended to abrogate the new value exception. Scholars are also di-
vided over the issue.9 Until Congress acts to clarify its intent,
liam C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization
of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 143-64 (1990) (discussing
survey results on how the reorganizing enterprise was divided among competing
claims and interests). In addition, resolving the question of control of the reorganized
business differs between publicly held and privately held businesses. Raymond T.
Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority and New
Value Contributions, 36 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1054-84 (1987) (owners of privately held
businesses deserve greater protection under the Code due to their greater liability).
Congress, recognizing the difficulty of reorganizing one type of closely held business,
the family farm, created a special chapter, Chapter 12, for reorganizing that type of
small business. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231 (1988). Chapter 12 is modeled after Chapter 13,
11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), which authorizes repayment plans for
individuals with secured and unsecured debts under specified limits. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e)
(1988). In both Chapters 12 and 13, the debtor may cram down a plan on dissenting,
unsecured creditors with impaired claims and retain ownership of her business as long
as the plan requires the debtor to apply all of her projected disposable income to reor-
ganization plan payments. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1), 1325(b)(1) (1988). Further recogni-
tion of the fact that the absolute priority rule may be inappropriate for small
businesses is the introduction of a bill in Congress for a small business reorganization
process similar to that found in Chapters 12 and 13. S. 1985, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 205(c) (1991), reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. S17048-53 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1991). The
sponsors of the bill seek Congressional approval for an eight-distrlct pilot project to
test this type of reorganization. 137 CONG. REC. S17057 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1991) (state-
ment by Sen. Grassley). The bill contains the same cramdown provision as in Chapters
12 and 13. S. 1985, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(c) (1991) (proposed 11 U.S.C.
§ 1026(b)(2)). For a description and evaluation of this bill, see Phillip J. Hendel, An
Enlightened Approach to Small Business Reorganization: Proposed Finetuning qf
Chapter 10, 7 Comm. L. Bulletin 11 (Jan./Feb. 1992). The Senate Judiciary Committee
revised the bill and sent a substitute bill to the Senate. S. Rep. 279, 102nd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1992). On June 17, 1992, the Senate passed the bill as amended on the Senate
floor. 138 Cong. Rec. 58359 (June 17, 1992). The bill as passed is printed at 138 Cong.
Rev. S 8359-71 (June 17, 1992). The House of Representatives referred to the bill to
the House Judiciary Committee. 138 Cong. Rec. H4981 (June 18, 1992).
9. See, e.g., John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MIcH. L.
REV. 963, 1011-16 (1989) (observing that Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988), at least sharply re-
stricted the use of the new value exception); Daren R. Brinkman, The New Value Ex-
ception to the Absolute Priority Rule After Ahlers, 106 BANKiNG L.J. 351, 358-62 (1989)
(arguing that Congress did not attempt to fully codify the absolute priority rule); Ken-
neth N. Klee, Cram Down M, 64 Am. BANKR. L.J. 229, 240-44 (1990) (in favor of retain-
ing the new value exception to protect against low valuations); Bruce A. Markell,
Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 69, 74-95 (1991) (the new value "exception" is better understood as an "extension"
of absolute priority principles); David M. Powlen & Arnold H. Wuhrman, The New
Value Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule: Is Ahlers the Beginning of the End?, 93
CoM. L.J. 303, 316-19 (1988) (courts might take different approaches to the new value
question); Jeffery M. Sharp, Bankruptcy Reorganizations, Section 1129, and the New
Capital Quagmire: A Call for Congressional Response, 28 Am. Bus. L.J. 525, 543-52
(1991) (Congress must clarify its intent behind section 1129 to restore order to the
bankruptcy system); Clifford S. Harris, Note, A Rule Unvanquished: The New Value
Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule, 89 MiCH. L. REv. 2301, 2316-22 (1991) (the new
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continued attempts to ascertain that intent will probably not be pro-
ductive. Accordingly, instead of trying to determine congressional in-
tent regarding the new value exception, this article discusses what
the rule ought to be regarding owner participation over creditor dis-
sent. The view proposed herein is based upon a functional analysis of
business reorganization law. A functional analysis identifies the
functions of the law and evaluates the doctrines at issue in light of
those functions. Deciding the extent to which a particular doctrine
will promote the various functions of the law requires a resolution of
conflicts between competing value choices.
Section II will review the current Chapter 11 reorganization pro-
cess, including the application of the absolute priority rule and the
new value exception. Section III will describe the functional ap-
proach to resolving bankruptcy issues. Section IV will review the
two dominant theories of business reorganization law, namely credi-
value exception protects creditors by continuing the business as a going concern, in-
stead of merely liquidating it).
Professor Sharp makes a convincing argument that the method of statutory inter-
pretation substantially determines the answer to whether Congress intended the new
value exception to exist. Using the plain language approach to statutory interpreta-
tion, new value is not part of the Code because Congress did not mention new value in
the statutory language. Sharp, supra, at 544-47. A more integrated approach to statu-
tory interpretation includes the legislative history and a presumption that if Congress
had wanted to change prior law, it would have said so. Commentators favoring this
approach contend that Congress meant to only partially codify the standards for
cramdown; the new value exception was part of the prior standards, and Congress did
not disclaim new value. Therefore, they maintain, new value is part of the Code.
Sharp, supra, at 548-52. Both approaches use legitimate methods of statutory interpre-
tation and both methods have been used by the courts to resolve the new value issue.
Compare In re Ribs Auto Sales, Inc., 140 B.R. 390, 393-94 (Bankr. E.D. Va 1992) with In
re Triple R Holdings, L.P., 134 B.R. 382, 384-92 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991), rev'd, 1992 WL
237328 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 1992), and In re Snyder, 967, F.2d 1126, 1128-31 (7th Cir.
1992). The justices of the Supreme Court cannot agree on the standards of statutory
interpretation that should be used in interpreting Code provisions. See Rusch, supra
note 4, at 180-81 & nn. 88-93; Charles Jordan Tabb and Robert M. Lawless, Of Com-
mas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist
Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REv. 823 (1991) (authors analyze Supreme Court bankruptcy
decisions and conclude the Court has not developed a consistent bankruptcy jurispru-
dence). In any event, allowing the statutory interpretation methodology to determine
the answer is unsatisfactory.
Professor Markell argues that the new value concept is not an exception to the abso-
lute priority rule; rather, new value is part of the concept of absolute priority. Mar-
kell, supra, at 96. He argues that if the reasonably equivalent criterion is properly
applied, requiring a distribution of the going concern value to the creditors, absolute
priority is preserved. Markell, supra, at 97-98. See infra note 91 and accompanying
text. See also In re Woodscape Ltd. Partnership, 134 B.R. 165, 173-74 (Bankr. D. Md.
1991) (holding that new contribution of money or money's worth in return for future
participation does not violate the absolute priority rule).
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tor's bargain and loss allocation, and their approaches to the new
value issue. Section V will contrast the functional approach to the
new value issue with the approaches of the creditor's bargain and loss
allocation theories. This article then concludes in Section VI that the
new value concept should be part of the Chapter 11 reorganization
process because new value is an essential tool for the parties and
judges. The parties need to use new value to negotiate consensual
plans, and judges need to use new value to evaluate whether owner
participation in the reorganization is desirable.
II. REORGANIZATION, ABSOLUTE PRIORITY, AND NEW VALUE
Congress formulated the Chapter 11 reorganization process for fi-
nancially distressed businesses' o based upon two fundamental prem-
ises. The first premise is that reorganizing a business instead of
liquidating its assets at a forced sale will often generate more value
than the liquidation of the assets." That extra value is called the go-
ing concern value. The second premise is that a successfully reorga-
nized business, as opposed to a liquidated business, benefits the entire
society through production of goods and services, employment, taxes
and other contributions.'2 These two premises, however, will not
necessarily hold true for every financially distressed business. One of
the first questions in every attempted reorganization is whether the
reorganization of this particular financially distressed business will
generate any going concern value and offer any additional benefit to
society. If the answer to that question is positive, then the next ques-
tion is how to distribute the going concern value and management
control among the creditors and the equity owners.
Instead of mandating the same answer to these two questions for
every business reorganization, Congress created a bargaining frame-
work for the owner and the creditors.' 3 If the parties fail to reach an
10. Congress designed Chapter 11 primarily for business reorganization. See S.
REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5789, 5795; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1978) reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5968. However, individuals not engaged in business may also seek
relief under Chapter 11. See Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197 (1991).
11. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 10, at 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6179-80. This premise is used to support the creditor's bargain theory of reorganiza-
tions. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
12. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 10, at 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6179-80. This premise is used to support Professor Korobkin's view that reorganization
is a process for deciding the debtor's future potential. See supra note 3.
13. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 10, at 224, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6183-84; Theodore Eisenberg, Commentary on "On the Nature of
Bankruptcy ": Bankruptcy and Bargaining, 75 VA. L. REV. 205, 205-11 (1989) (discuss-
ing provisions of the Code that either encourage or coerce parties to negotiate); Nim-
mer, supra note 8, at 1035-84; Rusch, supra note 4, at 196-200. See also J. Bradley
Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213 (1991) (recommending im-
provements to the negotiation process which is at the heart of Chapter 11).
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agreement, then congressional guidelines mandate whether the reor-
ganization should take place and how to distribute the value and con-
trol of the going concern. These guidelines, contained in the
cramdown provision of the Code,14 permit confirmation over a dis-
senting class of creditors only if the reorganization plan satisfies sev-
eral requirements. The cramdown requirements most relevant to the
new value issue 15 are that (i) at least one class of creditors with im-
paired16 claims accept the plan,17 (ii) each dissenting creditor with an
impaired claim receive at least the liquidation value of her claim,18
(iii) liquidation or further financial reorganization of the debtor-en-
terprise be unlikely after confirmation unless provided for in the
plan,19 and (iv) the plan be fair and equitable as to each dissenting
class of impaired claims.20
The Code contains only a partial codification 2' of the fair and equi-
14. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1988). Section 1129(b)(1) requires that the proponent
prove that the plan (i) meets all of the Section 1129(a) requirements except the re-
quirement that all classes of impaired claims accept the plan; (ii) does not unfairly dis-
criminate against impaired, dissenting classes of claims or interests; and (iii) is fair and
equitable to all impaired, dissenting classes of claims or interests. See Rusch, supra
note 4, at 168-75.
15. The requirements of Section 1129(a) that do not directly affect the new value
issue are contained in § 1129(a)(1) (plan conforms to all Title 11 requirements),
§ 1129(a)(2) (plan proponent complies with Title 11 requirements), § 1129(a)(3) (plan
proposed in good faith and is not illegal), § 1129(a)(4) (court approval for payment for
services rendered in connection with the case), § 1129(a)(5) (disclosure of affiliations),
§ 1129(a)(6) (applicable regulatory approval), § 1129(a)(9) (provision for certain prior-
ity claims under § 507), § 1129(a)(12) (payment of fees), § 1129(a)(13) (provision for
certain retirement benefits). 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (1988). The requirement in Section
1129(b)(1) that the plan cannot unfairly discriminate against impaired, dissenting
classes of claims or interests is also not directly relevant to the new value issue. 11
U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1988).
16. A claim is impaired when the proposed plan alters the debtor's contractual,
legal or equitable obligations on the claim. 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988). The usual way in
which a claim is impaired is if the claim is not paid in full. For a discussion of the
impairment concept see 5 LAWRENCE P. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1124.03
(15th ed. 1991) and Joseph M. Gaynor, Jr., Comment, Impairment, 3 BANKR. DEV. J.
579, 581 (1986).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (1988). See Rusch, supra note 4, at 180-205, regarding
the ability of the plan proponent to classify unsecured claims in order to create one
accepting class of impaired claims for cramdown purposes.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1988). This feasibility test requires a judicial determi-
nation that the debtor can fulfill the plan requirements and that the plan has a realis-
tic possibility of success. See Rusch, supra note 4, at 170-71 & n. 36.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1988).
21. The language of section 1129(b)(2) indicates the statutory definition is incom-
plete: "fair and equitable . . . includes the following requirements." 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2) (1988). See generally Klee, supra note 9 (discussing the uncodified aspects
of the fair and equitable rule).
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table requirement,2 2 which applies differently to secured and un-
secured claims.23 As to secured claims, the plan satisfies the fair and
equitable requirement if the dissenting secured creditor retains her
property lien and the plan provides for a stream of payments equal to
the total amount of the secured claim with a present value equal to
the value of the creditor's lien.24 The absolute priority rule comes
into play in a cramdown through the fair and equitable requirement
that applies to unsecured claims. "Absolute priority" means that if a
dissenting class 25 of unsecured claims is not paid in full, then no
claimant junior to that dissenting class can receive or retain any
property of the reorganized debtor on account of that junior claim or
22. Section 1129(b)(2) provides, in pertinent part:
For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and equi-
table with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
(A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides-
(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such
claims, whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the
debtor or transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed
amount of such claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of
such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed
amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan,
of at least the value of such holder's interest in the estate's interest in
such property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any prop-
erty that is subject to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of
such liens, with such liens to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and
the treatment of such liens on proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this
subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable
equivalent of such claims.
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims-
(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class re-
ceive or retain on account of such claim property of a value, as of the
effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim;
or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims
of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of
such junior claim or interest any property.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (1988).
23. The value of a secured claim is equal to the value of the collateral. 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(a) (1988); United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365,
372 (1988) ("The phrase 'value of such creditor's interest in § 506(a)' means 'the value
of the collateral.' "). See Rusch, supra note 4, at 166 & n. 14.
24. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (1988). See supra note 22 for statutory text. The
Code also provides two other means for satisfying the fair and equitable requirement
for secured claims: sale of the property with the secured creditor's interest attaching
to the proceeds or providing the indubitable equivalent of the secured claim. The
method stated in the text is the most common method used in reorganization plans.
See also Rusch, supra note 4, at 173 & n. 47.
25. A class of impaired claims accepts the plan when at least half of the voting
creditors that hold at least two-thirds of the dollar amount of claims in that class vote
in favor of the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1988). A dissenting class is any class of im-
paired claims that does not meet this numerical threshold statutorily required to ac-
cept the plan.
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interest.26 The new value exception, recognized by courts prior to
the revision of the 1978 Code, provides that if a junior claimant, usu-
ally the debtor's owner, contributes fresh capital, then she can retain
or receive an interest in the reorganized business even though a class
of senior unsecured dissenting claims has not been paid in full.27
This contribution must consist of fresh money or money's worth, and
be substantial, necessary, and reasonably equivalent to the interest in
the reorganized debtor-enterprise that the junior claimant receives or
retains. 28 In the 1988 case of Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers,29
the Supreme Court held that a sole proprietor's proposed labor con-
tribution to a farm operation was not a sufficient contribution to
meet the money or money's worth criterion of the new value excep-
tion.30  The Court stated in a footnote that it was not deciding
whether the new value exception survived enactment of the 1978
Code.31
The new value issue arises at a confirmation hearing when the
owners of the debtor-enterprise have been unable to persuade all
classes of creditors with impaired claims to accept the proposed
plan.3 2 Even though all classes with impaired claims did not accept
the plan, before the owner can attempt a cramdown, at least one
26. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1988). See supra note 22 for statutory text. Courts
developed the absolute priority rule to prevent bondholders and stockholders from us-
ing the equity receivership to sell the business to themselves while squeezing out inter-
mediate unsecured creditors. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 502-08
(1913). Subsequent statutory codifications required full satisfaction of creditors' claims
in order of priority before distribution to equity holders. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115-19 (1939) (Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 77B); Marine Harbor
Properties, Inc. v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 317 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1942) (Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, Chapter X); Sharp, supra note 9, at 526-30 & n. 24. Those methods of reorgani-
zation applied the absolute priority rule even if all classes of creditors accepted the
plan. 6A JAMES W. MOORE & LAWRENCE P. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRupTCY 11.06, at
232-34 (14th ed. 1978).
27. See, e.g., Peeples, supra note 8, at 75-77. The United States Supreme Court
created the new value exception to the absolute priority rule in Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. at 121-22. However, in Case, the Court did not allow eq-
uity participation because the proposed contribution of "management expertise" was
an insufficient contribution, incapable of valuation and, thus, not "money's worth." Id.
at 122-23. See Sharp, supra note 9, at 534-36.
28. See, e.g., Peeples, supra note 8, at 78-96; In re Creekside Landing, Ltd., 140
B.R. 713, 717-18 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1992); In re 222 Liberty Associates, 108 B.R. 971,
983-84 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); but see Markell, supra note 9, at 95 & n. 166 (substantial
is not a criterion mentioned in Case).
29. 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
30. Id. at 204-06.
31. Id. at 203 n.3.
32. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Creditors with unimpaired claims
are conclusively presumed to have accepted the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (Supp. 1988).
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class of impaired claimants must have voted to accept the plan.3 3
Thus, cramdown and the possibility of owner participation will not
occur when all classes of creditors with impaired claims reject the
plan.
Even if one class of impaired claims has accepted the plan, the
owner still cannot cram down a plan on creditors unless each dissent-
ing creditor receives at least the liquidation value of her claim,34 un-
less each dissenting secured creditor retains her lien and receives the
present value of its collateral,3 5 and unless the plan is feasible.3 6
These creditor protections balance the owner's ability to cram down a
plan on dissenting creditors.3 7 Thus, given the cramdown protections
for the dissenting classes, when a class of creditors with unpaid, un-
secured claims opposes the proposed new value contribution, the
creditors and equity owners are using the absolute priority rule and
new value exception as tools to fight over the distribution of the go-
ing concern value and the control of the reorganized business.3 8
III. A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO BANKRUPTCY ISSUES
A functional approach to legal issues acknowledges that law serves
several functions in our society and evaluates legal issues with those
functions in mind. Using this approach, legal issues should not be re-
solved in a way that would defeat the functions of a particular law.
A functional analysis of a legal issue involves four major steps.
The first step is to identify the functions of the law. Most laws
serve several functions at the same time.3 9 Professor Steve Smith
has identified at least three functions of law: (i) dispute resolution,
(ii) coordination of human behavior, and (iii) shaping a better
society.40
Each of these three functions is reflected to some degree in bank-
ruptcy law.41 For example, the Code structure provides a forum for
the financially distressed business and all of its creditors to resolve
33. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
35. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
37. See Rusch, supra note 4, at 196-98 (Code provisions balance the power between
creditors and the owners).
38. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
39. Steve Smith, Reductionism in Legal Thought, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 68, 69-74
(1991).
40. Id
41. Professor Smith believes that focusing on one function of the law, to the ex-
clusion of the other functions, results in a reductionist approach to legal thinking that
is overly simplistic and that distorts understanding and practice. Id. at 77-81. "A re-
ductionist depicture of law, regardless of which form the particular reductionism
takes, will distort legal understanding by presenting one perspective as if it were the
whole picture." Id. at 84. Professor Smith cites the law and economics movement as
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their disputes.42 By encouraging parties to negotiate reorganization
plans, Chapter 11 creates an opportunity for the debtor's owners and
creditors to coordinate their actions in reorganizing the company.43
Finally, establishing reorganization as an alternative to liquidation
under Chapter 744 indicates Congress' view that allowing reorganiza-
tions as an option is better for society than requiring all financially
distressed businesses to liquidate.45
Although the bankruptcy reorganization concept reflects each of
the three functions of law, the functional analysis requires further
refinement. The functions described above are too general to be very
useful in specific cases. For example, with regard to the third func-
tion, advancing a desirable social order, even though Congress gener-
ally considers business reorganization to be better for society than
liquidation, Congress does not allow every business to reorganize
under Chapter 11. Congress does not allow a Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion when each dissenting creditor with an impaired claim would re-
ceive less than the liquidation value of her claim.46
This example demonstrates that the social order function is limited
by certain conditions. Generally, reorganization is better for society
only when it gives each creditor with an impaired claim at least the
liquidation value of the claim. In other words, reorganization is bet-
ter for society, but only if the confirmation requirements, 47 which
represent congressionally imposed conditions to reorganization, are
met. The confirmation requirements represent value choices. The
liquidation value requirement represents such a value choice based
on the concept that the reorganization process should not inflict upon
a dissenting creditor more harm than that already caused by the
debtor's financial distress.48 Each legal requirement or doctrine may
implicate different societal values.
The second step of the functional approach, therefore, is to identify
the societal values that are relevant to the legal doctrine at issue.
Those values may be embodied in statutes, cases, legislative history
an example of a reductionist approach that emphasizes the third function of the law,
creating a desirable social order, to the exclusion of the other two. Id, at 74.
42. See Korobkin, supra note 3.
43. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
44. 11 U.S.C. §.5 701-766 (1988).
45. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988).
47. See supra notes 14-31 and accompanying text.
48. See Rusch, supra note 4, at 170.
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or other non-legal sources. The values are then used to add further
definition to the general functions of the law.
The third step is to determine whether any conflict between the
functions, as defined, exists. If conflict exists, the functions must be
examined to determine if the conflicts can be minimized. In the
event the functions cannot be reconciled, then a decision must be
made as to which function will be paramount.49 Finally, the fourth
step is to determine how the legal doctrine at issue can be structured
to promote the paramount function and lead to the desired results in
individual cases.
The new value issue has an impact on all three functions of bank-
ruptcy law: dispute resolution, coordination, and defining a desirable
social order. Functional analysis helps determine the impact that a
particular resolution of the new value issue will have on the three
functions of bankruptcy reorganization law. Functional analysis also
helps to determine what societal values embodied in these functions
are relevant to the new value issue. Finally, functional analysis pro-
vides a method for resolving conflicts between inconsistent functions
and values. The societal values chosen to further define the social or-
der function of reorganization law revolve around the two questions
raised earlier: (i) should this particular business reorganize and, if so,
(ii) how should the going concern value and control of the reorga-
nized debtor be distributed?50
IV. EXISTING THEORIES APPLIED TO THE NEW VALUE ISSUE
Before using the functional approach to evaluate the new value is-
sue, it is helpful to identify the functions and values that current re-
organization theories promote. The two dominant theories of
bankruptcy reorganization are the creditor's bargain theory and the
loss allocation theory. Each theory focuses on different functions.
The creditor's bargain school emphasizes the social order function,
whereas the loss allocation school emphasizes the dispute resolution
and coordination functions.
A. Creditor's Bargain
The premise of the creditor's bargain theory is that the reorganiza-
tion of a financially distressed enterprise should result in a going con-
cern value greater than the value realized in piecemeal sales of assets
through state law collection remedies. The reorganization process
then preserves this going concern value for the benefit of all credi-
tors. In exchange for not being allowed to dismantle the debtor-en-
49. See Smith, supra note 39, at 86-109.
50. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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terprise, the creditors are entitled to control the creation and
distribution of the going concern value.51 Thus, the paramount socie-
tal values promoted in the creditor's bargain theory are enhanced col-
lective creditor recovery and creditor control of the reorganization
process. These values represent the desirable social order under the
creditor's bargain theory.
The twin values of greater recovery for creditors as a whole and
creditor-controlled reorganization are also part of the creditor's bar-
gain approach to the new value exception.5 2 Two proponents of the
creditor's bargain theory, Professors Baird and Jackson, have pro-
posed valuing the debtor-enterprise on a going concern basis. Using
that going concern valuation, the claims against the debtor would be
ordered into the appropriate hierarchy of priority.53 The going con-
cern value would then be allocated to each class of claims in order of
priority. The class of claims that remains unpaid after that allocation
would be the residual owner of the debtor-enterprise. That residual
owner would decide whether the previous owner of the bankrupt
debtor could participate in the reorganization and would dictate the
terms of any such participation. The previous owner would not be al-
lowed to participate over the objection of the residual owner. The
residual owner's decision to allow or to disallow owner participation
51. See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
(1986); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganization, 15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 127 (1986); Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy:
An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditor's Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155
(1989); Thomas H. Jackson, Of Liquidation, Continuation, and Delay: An Analysis of
Bankruptcy Policy and Non-Bankruptcy Rules, 60 Am. BANKR. L.J. 399 (1986); Thomas
H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91
YALE L.J. 857 (1982).
52. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the
Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738 (1988); Douglas G. Baird
& Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorga-
nizations, 20 J. LEGAL STUDIES 311, 325-28, 344-47 (1991); David A. Skeel, The Uncer-
tain State of an Unstated Rule: Bankruptcy's Contribution Rule Doctrine After
Ahlers, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 236-39 (1989); James J. White, Absolute Priority and
New Value, 8 COOLEY L. REV. 1, 20-31 (1991); Derek J. Meyer, Note, Redefining the
New Value Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule in Light of the Creditor's Bargain
Model, 24 IND. L. REV. 417 (1991).
53. The creditor's bargain theorists maintain that this distribution among the
ranks of creditors should respect state law entitlements. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird &
Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Owner-
ship Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bank-
ruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97 (1984); Thomas H. Jackson, Translating Assets and
Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 73 (1985); Lawrence Ponoroff
& F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement Sentinel of
an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 919, 955 (1991).
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is presumed to be the best decision to enhance collective creditor
recovery.54
The creditor's bargain theorists would allocate to the residual
owner all decision-making authority to determine whether the busi-
ness reorganization should take place, who should control the reorga-
nized debtor, and how the going concern value of the reorganized
debtor should be distributed. The creditor's bargain theory leads to
the conclusion that a new value exception would undermine the val-
ues of creditor control and enhanced collective creditor recovery be-
cause the new value exception would remove absolute control from
the residual owner.
B Loss Allocation
Loss allocation theorists view bankruptcy as a process that Con-
gress created to allocate losses among all interested parties when a
debtor encounters financial distress.55 The allocation of these losses
is necessarily based upon a balancing of competing values.56 Con-
gress reconciles these conflicting values in whatever way Congress
sees fit, subject only to constitutional limitations.57
Reorganization, as opposed to liquidation, is just one process that
allows the creditors and the owner to negotiate the allocation of the
greater going concern value.56 The loss allocation theorists consider
the new value exception as a source of leverage that the business
owner can use to force recalcitrant creditors to the bargaining table.5 9
54. Baird & Jackson, supra note 52.
55. Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 789-93 (1987);
Nimmer, supra note 8, at 1013-34.
56. Warren, supra note 55, at 789-93; see Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 53,
at 959-62. But see Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification
for Financial Rehabilitation of the Consumer Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515
(1991) (advancing a natural law moral justification for discharging consumer debtors).
Other scholars have made the connection between principles of bankruptcy and princi-
ples of morality and value conflict. See, e.g., Philip Shuchman, An Attempt at a "Phi-
losophy of Bankruptcy," 21 UCLA L. REV. 403 (1973) (describing bankruptcy as a
reflection of cultural values regarding obligations); Robert Weisberg, Commercial Mo-
rality, the Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 3 (1986). See generally Paul G. Haskell, Teaching Moral Analysis in Law School,
66 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1025, 1029 (1991) (law has moral content). In addition, indi-
vidual moral convictions have an impact on how people utilize existing laws. See TE-
RESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR
DEBTORS 336-38 (1989) (moral convictions influence the decisions of consumer debtors
in bankruptcy).
57. For a discussion of the limitations on Congress' bankruptcy power, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 4, see James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights
in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the
Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973 (1983).
58. See Korobkin, supra note 3.
59. See Elizabeth Warren, Absolute Priority, New Value and Theories of Bank-
ruptcy, 11-25, 11-33 (Bankruptcy Update 1990, 64th Annual Meeting of the National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, Nov. 7-10 1990) (hereinafter Warren, Bankruptcy
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In addition, the new value exception is a tool that allows the bank-
ruptcy judge to decide whether to permit reorganization and how to
distribute the value and control of this reorganized debtor-enter-
prise.60 However, the loss allocation theorists have not specified the
societal values that should guide the judge's evaluation of these two
essential questions.61 Under the loss allocation theory, the primary
functions of reorganization are the coordination of the parties' behav-
ior and the resolution of disputes. Because the new value exception
aids these functions, it should be a part of the Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion process.
C. Comparison
The creditor's bargain and loss allocation theories each promote
different functions and values. The creditor's bargain school pro-
motes the social order function of reorganization law, with creditor
control and enhanced collective creditor recovery as the primary soci-
etal values. The creditor's bargain theory ignores the dispute resolu-
tion and coordination functions. Loss allocation, however, promotes
both coordination and dispute resolution through negotiation. But if
coordination fails, the loss allocation method offers no guidance as to
the values to be promoted as part of the desirable social order in de-
ciding whether the particular reorganization should take place or
how the going concern value and control should be distributed be-
tween the debtor's owners and the creditors.
V. APPLYING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
TO THE NEW VALUE ISSUE
This section examines the new value issue using the functional ap-
proach, identifies the major societal values that the new value issue
implicates, and compares the functional approach with the creditor's
bargain and loss allocation theories.
The absolute priority rule and the new value exception directly re-
late to all three functions: dispute resolution, coordination, and pro-
motion of the desired social order for owner participation over
creditor dissent. In reorganization law, a strong connection exists be-
Update]; Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of Absolute Priority, 1991 Ann. Surv. of Am.
Law 9, 29-33 [hereinafter Warren, Absolute Priority]; but see LoPucki & Whitford,
supra, note 8, at 143-64.
60. See Warren, Bankruptcy Update, supra note 59, at 11-32 (new value exception
allows judge to evaluate fairness of the plan).
61. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
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tween the coordination and dispute resolution functions because the
more the creditors and the owner of the debtor-enterprise negotiate,
the more likely the parties will reach a global settlement as part of
the plan. Thus, to the extent a reorganization doctrine encourages
coordination, it is also likely to encourage dispute resolution through
negotiation. Because of the close connection between the coordina-
tion and dispute resolution functions, this article will refer to both as
the coordination function.
Coordination between creditors and the owner of the debtor-enter-
prise ideally results in a consensual reorganization plan. To en-
courage coordination, the Code gives both sides a set of bargaining
tools.62 The absolute priority rule and the new value exception are
two of the tools that the creditors and the debtor's owner use to bar-
gain about the two practical questions63 present in every reorganiza-
tion: should this business reorganize and how should its going
concern value and control be distributed between its owner and
creditors?
The absolute priority rule and the new value exception are also
relevant to the social order function of bankruptcy law. When the
coordination function fails to produce a consensual reorganization
plan, the absolute priority rule and the new value exception provide
default rules for distributing the going concern value and control of
the reorganized business between creditors and the owner. These de-
fault rules, which involve value choices, represent the desired social
order when coordination fails.
Congressional emphasis on negotiated consensual plans6 4 makes
the coordination function paramount. Only if coordination fails does
62. See Rusch, supra note 4, at 196-200. See supra notes 13-38 and accompanying
text.
63. A consideration of the parties' motivations illustrates their respective bargain-
ing positions. The owner wants to make the new value contribution and continue to
participate in the business as the owner because otherwise the business will liquidate
and cease to exist. The unsecured creditors resist the cash contribution and the
planned cramdown because they would rather take the liquidation value of their
claims now than receive payments over time under the plan, even if the present value
of the payments is the same as the liquidation value. This is the essence of the parties'
dispute over whether to liquidate or reorganize this particular business.
In the struggle for control of the business, the owner wants to participate in the re-
organization effort as the owner, rather than as an employee, while the unsecured
creditors want someone else to own and operate the reorganized business. In the fight
over distribution of value, the owner wants to reap the future profits of the business if
the reorganization effort is successful while the unsecured creditors want to receive a
larger percentage of money than proposed in the plan. If the new value exception does
not exist, the view of the unsecured creditors as to the "correct" resolution of control
and distribution will always prevail. If the new value exception does exist and the
plan is confirmed, the owner's view of the "correct" resolution of those questions will
prevail. See infra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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the social order function become relevant. Thus, the new value ex-
ception's impact on the coordination function will be explored first.
A. New Value and the Coordination Function
To determine whether the new value exception is a critical tool for
the coordination function, the first question is whether the new value
exception is a necessary tool to arrive at consensual plans. To pro-
mote the parties' coordination so that they can arrive at a consensual
plan, each side needs bargaining tools to strengthen its position.6 5
For a non-publicly held business where the owner participates in
management, if the new value exception does not exist, the absolute
priority rule gives the dissenting class with unsecured claims a means
to stop any attempt to reorganize the business. Therefore, to deter-
mine whether the new value exception is a necessary tool for the co-
ordination function, the next question is whether the owner needs
the new value exception in order to bring creditors to the bargaining
table.
If the dissenting class with unsecured claims is also the residual
owner of the financially distressed business, the creditor's bargain
theorists believe that that class should have the absolute authority to
stop the reorganization.6 6 The assumption is that the residual owner
will oppose the prior owner's participation in the reorganized busi-
ness when that decision maximizes the wealth for all creditors. Be-
cause the creditor's bargain theorists consider the residual owner's
decision the "best" decision for all creditors, these theorists reason
that the former owner needs no leverage to force the residual owner
to bargain. If reorganization with the prior owner's participation is
wealth-maximizing, the residual owner will bargain with that owner.
If such reorganization is not wealth-maximizing, the residual owner
will not bargain.
The premise that the residual owner will support owner participa-
tion if it maximizes the wealth for all creditors67 rests on two under-
65. See supra notes 13-38, 62 and accompanying text.
66. The residual owners may or may not be the dissenting class of unsecured
claims. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. For instance, Professors Baird
and Jackson posit the situation where the residual owner is the senior undersecured
creditor. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 52, at 750-51. When this occurs, they recom-
mend eliminating the absolute priority rule, which gives final authority to the class of
unsecured creditors, and giving that final authority to the senior undersecured
creditor.
67. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether mone-
tary wealth maximization is a desirable social order.
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lying assumptions. First, the residual owner will act rationally,
balancing monetary costs against monetary benefits and choosing the
option resulting in the greatest monetary wealth. Second, the choice
that maximizes the wealth of the residual owner also maximizes the
wealth of all other creditors.
Each of these assumptions is faulty, thus casting doubt on the view,
under the creditor's bargain theory, that the owner of the debtor-en-
terprise does not need the leverage of the new value exception. The
first assumption, that the residual owner will make the optimal mon-
etary wealth-maximizing decision, is flawed because the residual
owner's decision will not necessarily be based only on monetary val-
ues.68 The residual owner may value the ability to walk away with
the liquidation value of her claim, even if reorganization would result
in her receiving a larger recovery. If this is the case, a non-pecuniary
value, the freedom to walk away, trumps the pecuniary value, the
greater recovery. Non-monetary factors often influence decision
making.6 9 Any time the residual owner makes a decision based upon
non-pecuniary factors, that decision will not necessarily maximize
monetary wealth.
Second, even if the residual owner decides to maximize her own
monetary wealth, that decision will not necessarily maximize the
wealth for all other creditors. The residual owner may choose to liq-
uidate the business, rather than reorganize, because of factors exter-
nal to the reorganization effort, such as that creditor's overall profit
and loss picture. If the residual owner is a major lender and is trying
to set an example for other borrowers, the residual owner might liq-
uidate one or two debtors, thereby taking a lower repayment in these
cases, in order to encourage greater repayment from other borrowers.
The residual owner's decision to liquidate the debtor-enterprise will
not necessarily maximize the monetary wealth for other creditors,
for whom reorganization may represent the only hope of any signifi-
cant debt repayment. Thus, the premise that the best result for the
residual owner is the best result for all the debtor's creditors is not
necessarily true.
Because the assumptions underlying the premise that the residual
owner will make the optimal wealth-maximizing decision are false,
the further premise that the owner does not need the new value ex-
68. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 365-66 (1991);
James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy
Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2097, 2143-44
(1990).
69. It is not hard to imagine a creditor belonging to the "once burned, twice shy"
school of decision-making. See POSNER, supra note 68, at 365-66 (people take into ac-
count non-monetary values in deciding upon a course of action).
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ception as leverage to encourage the creditors to make the wealth-
maximizing decision is also false.
The new value exception encourages unsecured creditors to bar-
gain with the owner for a consensual plan because a plan can be con-
firmed even if an unsecured claims class dissents. The loss allocation
theorists endorse the new value exception as a tool to encourage such
bargaining.70 However, in order to fulfill the coordination function
of bankruptcy law, the new value exception must not allow the
owner of the debtor-enterprise to avoid the bargaining process that
leads to consensual plans. The creditor's bargain theorists argue that
the new value exception does give the owner the ability to opt out of
the bargaining process.71 This view is premised on the assumption
that bankruptcy judges uncritically endorse any and every proposed
owner contribution. This perspective of bankruptcy judges is based
on a perception of either on pro-debtor judicial bias72 or judicial in-
competence, 73 both of which are unfounded.
The fear of pro-debtor bias is supported at best by anecdotal evi-
dence and at worst by mere presumption. No proof is available that
bankruptcy judges, as a whole, neglect their responsibility to make
legally correct and fair decisions.74 In addition, no one has demon-
strated that bankruptcy judges do not possess the necessary skill and
expertise to determine whether owner participation in the reorgani-
zation is desirable. 75 Believing that markets are the best place to de-
70. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. At least one court has explicitly
recognized this effect on the parties' bargaining. See In re Triple R Holdings, L.P., 134
B.R. 382, 386-89 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991), rev'd., 1992 WL 237328 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15,
1992).
71. Baird & Picker, supra note 52, at 328 (new value exception provides an option
for the owners of the debtor-enterprise to abandon the bargaining process).
72. James J. White, Taking from Farm Lenders and Farm Debtors: Chapter 12 of
the Bankruptcy Code, 13 J. CoRP. L. 1, 15-16 (1987).
73. Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganiza-
tion, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 547-48 (1983).
74. Patrick B. Bauer, Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit: A Response
to Professor White's Sortie Against Chapter 12, 13 J. CoRp. L. 33, 39-40 & n. 42 (1987).
75. See In re Triple R Holdings, L.P., 134 B.R. 382, 391-92 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991),
rev'd, 1992 WL 237328 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 1992) (no evidence that judges are out of
control on this issue). The decisions that judges would have to make if the new value
exception exists are no more complex or difficult than the decisions that judges and
juries make every day in complex commercial litigation cases that require valuation of
harm. Furthermore, instead of unskilled jurors making these decisions, experienced
bankruptcy judges, who see the same issues and hear the same types of evidence re-
peatedly, would evaluate the proposed new value contribution. Repetition gives the
bankruptcy judge increased competence in evaluating the credibility of expert testi-
mony on enterprise value and plan feasibility. Moreover, the critical issues in a
cramdown are tried in an adversarial manner, with both sides having the opportunity
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termine value, the creditor's bargain theorists criticize placing
valuation questions in the hands of people not parties to the negotia-
tion, even a judge. Thus, their objection to judges making the valua-
tions that application of the new value exception would require is not
based upon particular instances or even a pattern of erroneous valua-
tions, but upon a system-wide belief that judges should not make
these decisions because judicial valuations are not market-based.
However, the creditor's bargain theorists ignore the fact that in a
cramdown situation, the market (negotiation) has failed. When mar-
ket failure occurs, the legal system has commonly allowed third par-
ties to value the rights at issue.76
As demonstrated above, some type of new value concept that
would allow existing owners to buy their way back into a business
over the dissent of unpaid, unsecured creditors, is a necessary tool to
provide each of the parties with enough leverage to negotiate toward
a consensual plan. Elimination of the new value concept would give
absolute power to the dissenting class of unsecured creditors to liqui-
date the business. Uncritical approval of any proposed contribution
would give the owner absolute power to run roughshod over the dis-
senting creditors. However, neither the creditors nor the owners
have absolute power if a neutral third party, such as a bankruptcy
judge, critically evaluates the proposed contribution to ensure that it
meets the accepted standards. Thus, a new value concept is needed
to balance the rule of absolute priority and to promote the coordina-
tion function of Chapter 11 reorganization law.
B. New Value and the Social Order Function
To evaluate a proposed owner contribution, judges need criteria.
Developing these criteria requires a definition of the desired social
order, which, in turn, requires lawmakers to choose among compet-
ing societal values. 77 These values define the appropriate circum-
stances for owner participation in spite of creditor dissent. The
ultimate goal is to determine when owner participation in the reor-
ganization will result in a positive contribution to society. Resolution
of the new value issue from the social order function perspective,
however, should not undermine the paramount coordination function
to present evidence and cross-examine the opponent's experts. Doubts about the abil-
ity of bankruptcy judges to make "correct" decisions after they hear the evidence are
really doubts about the adversary process itself.
76. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamad, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1106-10
(1972).
77. See POSNER, supra note 68, at 119, 141, 233-43; Smith, supra note 39, at 73-75.
See generally John B. Attanasio, Foreword. The Impoverished States of Law and Mo-
rality, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 773 (1989).
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of reorganization law that encourages the creditors and owners to ne-
gotiate a consensual plan.
Both the creditor's bargain theory and the loss allocation theory
have deficiencies when evaluated in light of the social order function
of Chapter 11 reorganization law. The creditor's bargain theory is de-
ficient due to the unsupported value choices present in its definition
of the desirable social order for owner participation. The deficiency
in the loss allocation theory is its failure to provide a method for
making value choices in the event the coordination function fails.
The creditor's bargain theorists promote creditor control of the re-
organization process and enhanced collective creditor recovery as the
primary values in determining the desirability of owner participa-
tion.7 8 However, the creditor's bargain theorists have not justified
why promotion of these two values will improve society. Even if
creditor control and enhanced recovery lead to an efficient result ac-
cording to economic theory,7 9 nothing in economic theory supports
the proposition that efficiency is the desirable social order.80 The
creditor's bargain theorists fail to recognize that with their theory, as
with any theory, any definition of a desirable social order involves a
choice among competing societal values. Values other than economic
efficiency or wealth maximization could be equally important, or
even more important, to society.81 For instance, society could legiti-
mately promote the value of debtor rehabilitation over the value of
creditor wealth maximization.8 2
78. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
79. As previously discussed, the assumption that these two values produce a
wealth-maximizing, economically efficient result is doubtful. See supra notes 67-69
and accompanying text.
80. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW § 1.2, at 13 (3rd ed.
1986) (economic theory may indicate what is efficient, i.e., wealth-maximizing, but
nothing in economic theory tells us that efficiency will make society a better place);
Robin Paul Malloy, Is Law and Economics Moral?-Humanistic Economics and a
Classical Liberal Critique of Posner's Economic Analysis, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 147, 154-
57, 160 (1990) (although Posner's economic analysis promotes certain values, nothing in
economic theory justifies those values as most important). In his new book, Judge
Posner states that wealth maximization should be redefined to include non-monetary
values in the maximization equation. POSNER, supra note 68, at 356. If that is true,
then wealth maximization is simply another term for value balancing.
81. David Gray Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1353
(1987) (reviewing THoMAs H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
(1986)); Warren, supra note 55, at 789-93; see Flint, supra note 56, at 524 (all normative
theory involves value choices); Donald R. Korobkin, Value and Rationality in Bank-
ruptcy Decisionmaking, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 333, 337-44 (1992).
82. See Flint, supra note 56, at 523-26 (discussing debtor rehabilitation in the con-
sumer context). Some scholars, speaking from an economic perspective, question
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The loss allocation theorists, on the other hand, recognize that in
creating bankruptcy law, Congress has chosen among competing val-
ues,8 3 but they do not identify the paramount values that should be
advanced when an owner participates in reorganization.8 4 The loss
allocation view relies entirely upon Congress to make the choices and
balance the competing values. If Congress' intent is not clear on how
whether bankruptcy law is justified because it changes the debtor and creditor rules
embodied in state law. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping,
and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 822-23 (1987). There are
several reasons this change is justified. First, different people, with different views of
the ultimate goal, are deciding what values are paramount. The values that are impor-
tant to a particular legislature will be reflected in that state's laws. However, nothing
is sacred about state law that makes those value choices the ultimate right answer. See
Carlson, supra note 81, at 1348. Second, even if state laws are "correct" value choices
on a state level, it is equally legitimate for federal lawmakers to decide that different
value choices should operate on a federal level. See generally Theodore Eisenberg,
Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953 (1981) (criticizing bankruptcy
law changes from state law); Steven L. Harris, A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg's Bank-
ruptcy Law in Perspective, 30 UCLA L. REV. 327 (1982) (arguing that bankruptcy is
one method of balancing competing interests of creditors and debtors). Third, forum
shopping, a problem of two systems operating simultaneously, Baird, supra, at 824-25,
presupposes that one system offers a superior set of choices. That is, those that argue
against changes from the state law system, are presupposing that the state law system
is superior to the federal bankruptcy system. The opposite conclusion-that the fed-
eral bankruptcy system is the superior system and no creditor should ever be allowed
to use the state law system-could just as easily be drawn. See Lynn M. LoPucki, A
General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 WIS.
L. REV. 311, 315-62 (1982). Neither the state system nor the bankruptcy system is in-
herently superior. Reasonable people could disagree about what value choices are
appropriate.
83. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. See also Korobkin, supra note
81, at 353-65 (Congress chose among competing values regarding the rights of parties in
bankruptcy to collective bargaining contracts).
84. According to Professor Elizabeth Warren, new value provides a mechanism for
evaluating whether the parties' use of bargaining leverage is legitimate or illegitimate.
Warren, Bankruptcy Update, supra note 59, at 11-33 to 11-34. She classifies as illegiti-
mate, leverage based upon noise-making, leverage used because the party is insulated
from the consequences of its actions, or leverage based upon informational deficits. Id.
at 11-34. This approach has at least two problems. First, judges may not be able to
determine whether the parties' use of leverage is legitimate or not. Second, even if the
judge can make that determination, this analysis provides no basis for deciding be-
tween two legitimate uses of leverage, such as a creditor's desire to receive bigger pay-
ments and the owner's desire to rehabilitate the business.
Professor Warren has recently proposed that owner participation should be allowed
whenever that option creates the greatest amount of value to the estate. Warren, Ab-
solute Priority, supra note 59, at 19-28. This premise has at least two drawbacks.
First, Warren ignores other criteria, such as the desire to rehabilitate a business, that
would be important in determining whether owner participation should be allowed.
Harvey R. Miller, Commentary on Professor Warren's Paper: Absolute Priority, 1991
Ann. Surv. of Am. Law, at 49-51, 67-68. Second, Warren's theory does not address the
critical issues of control and distribution of that enhanced estate value. Even if owner
participation enhances value, that value will either be distributed to creditors, retained
in the company, or distributed to the owners. Warren's theory does not address what
group should receive the benefit of that enhanced value. Alan R. Resnick, Commen-
tary on Professor Warren's Paper: Absolute Priority, 1991 Ann. Surv. of Am. Law, at
59-60.
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to balance the values implicated by a particular legal issue, this the-
ory leaves decision-makers without guidance.
In deciding whether a particular business should reorganize and
how its control and value should be distributed in the absence of a
consensual plan, at least two values are important in defining the de-
sirable social order: (i) the desire to pay existing creditors as much as
possible and (ii) the desire to place the risk of business failure on the
owner, not the creditors. These two competing values help deter-
mine when owner participation is preferred in spite of creditor dis-
sent. However, these values cannot be reconciled with a general rule
for determining, in all cases, whether an owner should participate as
an owner in the reorganized business. The new value exception is a
tool the court could use for reconciling these two values in particular
cases. Thus, the criteria of the new value exception should be ap-
plied in each case in such a way as to reconcile the competing values
of the greatest possible repayment to creditors and owner assumption
of the risk of business failure.
The current new value criteria are that the proposed contribution
consist of the following: (i) Fresh (ii) money or money's worth that
is (iii) substantial, (iv) necessary, and (v) reasonably equivalent to
the interest in the reorganized debtor that the owner of the debtor-
enterprise receives or retains.8 5 The first four criteria can be used to
allocate the risk of business failure to the owner. The fifth criterion
can be used to maximize repayment to existing creditors.
In every business reorganization, the risk of failure is twofold.
First, there is the risk of the initial failure that resulted in using the
reorganization process. Second, there is the risk that the business
will fail after the reorganization process. By the time the owner in-
vokes the Chapter 11 process, the first business failure is occurring or
has occurred. The business has failed for the second time if the reor-
ganization plan is confirmed but the debtor-enterprise is unable to
complete the plan, or the business fails after the plan is completed.86
The first four criteria of the new value rule can be used to keep the
risks of both business failures on the owner.
The criterion that the contribution be money or money's worth
helps keep both risks of failure on the owner. When the owner oper-
85. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
86. The feasibility requirement contained in the confirmation standards is
designed to guard against the second risk of failure. See supra note 19 and accompany-
ing text. However, if the reorganization plan is unsuccessful, the owners of the reorga-
nized debtor-enterprise should bear the risk of that second failure.
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ates and/or manages the business, the owner is already contributing
labor and expertise when the business failed the first time. Thus, if
an owner's future labor contribution were sufficient to allow her con-
tinued ownership in the business, the creditors, not the owner, would
have borne the first risk of failure. Similarly, promising to contrib-
ute labor does not cause the owner to incur any additional risk that
would warrant giving her a second chance to make the business suc-
cessful. Requiring the contribution of "hard assets," however, does
place the second risk of failure on the owner.8 7
The next two criteria, that the contribution be fresh and substan-
tial, also place the risk of both failures on the owner. A "fresh" con-
tribution means that the contribution cannot come from the assets of
the failed business. A "substantial" contribution means that the loss
of the funds, if the business fails for the second time, will hurt the
owner. Both of these requirements force the owner to bear the risk
of the first failure because the owner must put more assets at risk in
order to have a second chance. Moreover, these two criteria force the
owner to risk losing these assets in the event the business fails a sec-
ond time.
The criterion that the contribution be necessary places the risk of
the first failure on the owner and lessens the risk of the second fail-
ure occurring at all. Currently, the necessity criterion means that
the contribution is necessary to fund the plan.88 This inquiry is mis-
directed because the owner will always write the plan so that the
contribution is necessary to fund the plan.8 9 The inquiry should be:
Is it necessary that this owner contribute the funds? By requiring
some explanation for why the business failed in the first place, this
inquiry holds the owner responsible for the first failure and also
reduces the likelihood of a second failure.
For example, if the business failed because of mismanagement, the
owner should have to surmount a relatively high showing of neces-
sity in order to buy her way back into the ownership position. In ad-
dition, if the creditors claim that the owner's contribution is not
necessary, the creditors should have the opportunity to select some-
one who is able to make the contribution and to operate the business
competently.90 Thus, the thrust of the necessity requirement should
87. One author has argued for a best efforts standard to judge labor contributions
in Chapter 11. Peeples, supra note 8, at 103-07. That is the standard used in Chapter
12 and 13 reorganizations. See supra note 8. In evaluating the desirability of a best
efforts standard, the issue is whether that standard would allow the owner of the
debtor-enterprise to escape the risks of business failure in a manner compatible with
societal values.
88. Peeples, supra note 8, at 80-83.
89. But see Markell, supra note 9, at 112-13 (the "necessary" criterion is not
necessary).
90. Some authors have suggested a bidding process to accomplish this goal. See
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be an inquiry into alternative funding and a decision whether the
current owner is the best possible candidate to reorganize and oper-
ate the business successfully. If the owner is allowed to buy back the
ownership position without the court making the above inquiry, the
owner has avoided bearing the risk of the first failure altogether, as
well as increased the risk of the second failure.
The final criterion is that the contribution be reasonably
equivalent to the interest the owner will receive or retain in the reor-
ganized business. This requirement should be used to maximize re-
payment of creditors by preventing the owner from capturing any of
the going concern value that is not directly attributable to her partic-
ipation in the business.91 The parties should submit estimates of the
business' going concern value without the owner's participation.
That amount must be distributed to existing creditors, not retained in
the company. Any part of the going concern value that is attributa-
ble to the owner's participation need not be distributed to creditors.
This division of the going concern value between the owner and the
creditors is an accommodation of two fundamental beliefs: insolvent
companies should belong to existing creditors92 and creditors are not
entitled to the continued participation of the owner.9 3 Thus, credi-
tors are repaid the maximum amount possible given the societal
value that prohibits the owner's involuntary servitude.
Bankruptcy judges should use the new value criteria to make the
inquiries described above. The new value rule would then be an ef-
fective tool to accommodate the conflict between the two major val-
ues that define the circumstances in which owner participation
should occur over the dissent of unpaid creditors. If the owner's pro-
Richard L. Epling, The New Value Exception: Is There a Practica Workable Solu-
tion?, 8 BANKR. DEv. J. 335, 340-47 (1991) (noting that a market process is probably
unworkable in the closely held business context); Klee, supra note 9, at 243-44; In re
Bjolmes Realty Trust, 134 B.R. 1000, 1008-10 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991). One difficulty
with the bidding process is the informational deficit that non-owners have in determin-
ing what to bid for a company. Warren, Absolute Priority, supra note 59, at 15-18.
91. See In re Jartran, 44 B.R. 339, 368 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984); Markell, supra note
9, at 97-98. According to Professor Markell, the principle of absolute priority is
respected as long as the going concern value is distributed to creditors. See also Walter
J. Blum & Stanley A. Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in Corporate Reorgani-
zations, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 651, 668-71 (1974); In re Bjolmes Realty Trust, 134 B.R.
1000, 1011 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) (recognizing that shareholders should be able to cap-
ture the difference in value based upon their contribution to the business).
92. The judicial development of the absolute priority rule reflects this idea. See
supra note 26 and accompanying text.
93. See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 10, at 32, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5818; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 10, at 322, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6278.
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posed contribution were evaluated using the concepts described
above, the new value exception would allow all interested parties an
opportunity to determine whether the past owner's skill and exper-
tise are most likely to make the reorganization successful and
whether the creditors are receiving all of the value to which they are
entitled.
VI. CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy issues should be evaluated according to their impact on
the functions of bankruptcy law and based upon explicit identifica-
tion and reconciliation of conflicting societal values. The approach
advocated herein is merely a starting point for examining bankruptcy
issues. A balance between the competing values could be struck in
different ways.94 Where to strike the balance is not nearly as impor-
tant as recognizing the connection between doctrines and values.
Reasonable people can disagree about what values should be empha-
sized and where the line between competing values should be drawn.
However, to ignore or deny that doctrinal debates involve value-
laden choices is to offer seemingly simplistic solutions to complex
problems that are not really solutions at all.
Based upon the functional value-balancing approach described
herein, the new value exception to the absolute priority rule should
exist. The application of the exception should allow reorganization
with owner participation over the objection of unpaid, unsecured
creditors as long as (i) the risks of business failure rest squarely with
the owner, (ii) the maximum reorganization value is distributed to
creditors, and (iii) the contributing owner's continued operation of
the business is the best option available for all of the creditors.
94. For example, the ability of owners to participate in reorganizations and the
conditions upon that participation are different in Chapter 12 and 13 reorganizations.
See supra note 8. The Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 criteria reflect a different accommo-
dation of the same two conflicting values discussed in this article.
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